A classified meeting held in the heart of Port Sudan has exposed a growing convergence between Sudan’s de facto military leadership and key remnants of the Islamist deep state, with Egyptian backing playing a central role in shaping the next phase of Sudan’s political architecture.
Europost has learned through a high-level source that General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan chaired a covert gathering late Tuesday inside a discreet apartment linked to his personal secretary, Mudathir, who is also the son-in-law of Ali Karti, the influential leader of Sudan’s Islamist movement and former foreign minister. The location—guarded by plainclothes security—hosted senior figures from the defunct National Congress Party (NCP) and former regime stalwarts, including Ahmed Haroun, Osama Abdalla, Mohamed Yousif Kibir, Al-Sadiq Fadlallah, and Ezzeldin Hamouda.
According to the source, Burhan opened the meeting with a strategic briefing summarizing his recent diplomatic trip to Cairo, during which Egyptian authorities expressed explicit concern over the overt return of Islamist leaders to the political foreground in Sudan. The Egyptian side, aiming to maintain a regional image of stability and secular military governance, urged Sudanese military authorities to “de-Islamize the surface while preserving influence beneath it.”
This marks a significant shift in tactics. Rather than cutting ties with Islamist networks, Sudanese generals are now orchestrating a rebranding strategy: sidelining high-profile Islamist leaders while empowering a new generation of loyal but publicly untainted operatives drawn from the lower echelons of the dissolved NCP and associated networks. These individuals are now being groomed to occupy administrative and executive roles in a post-war political landscape, one designed to appear non-ideological to both domestic and international observers.
The meeting concluded with a consensus to relocate senior Islamist figures from Port Sudan to less visible regions, particularly to the River Nile, Northern, Gezira, White Nile, and Sennar states. The aim, according to the source, is twofold: reduce public scrutiny and facilitate underground coordination away from media and intelligence attention.
Burhan reportedly emphasized that the new appointments must come from individuals with no direct links to past regime atrocities or public controversies, in order to withstand international vetting and potential transitional frameworks in the future.
Beyond politics, the group discussed external support. Burhan assured participants that he had secured multi-layered backing from key regional allies. Egypt pledged continued diplomatic protection and advisory coordination, while Qatar committed to financing arms acquisitions, including drone technology and artillery systems. Turkey reportedly agreed to expand its covert training programs for Sudanese forces. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has taken the lead on medical and humanitarian fronts, including plans to send equipment and personnel to military hospitals in Port Sudan and Atbara under the guise of humanitarian relief.
Perhaps most telling was the emphasis on information warfare. Intelligence operatives and media liaisons were tasked with shaping the national and international narrative by suppressing references to Islamist involvement in current power structures. Instead, the new media strategy focuses on portraying Sudan’s military leadership as a nationalist force combating extremism and instability—despite their coordination with the very networks responsible for decades of authoritarian rule.
On the ground, military dynamics were also addressed. Participants agreed to accelerate operations in strategically contested areas, especially in Omdurman’s Salha district and across the Kordofan region. These gains, they argued, would enhance the military’s leverage in any future negotiations, and potentially shift the balance in favor of a “controlled political transition” rather than one led by civilian or rebel factions.
This clandestine Port Sudan summit offers a rare glimpse into how Sudan’s military leadership—under Egyptian tutelage—is adapting its power tactics. Rather than dismantling the old Islamist state, it is being quietly restructured and disguised, embedded in new faces and regional alliances. For observers in Washington, Brussels, and Addis Ababa, the message is clear: Sudan’s future may be changing shape, but the architects remain the same—only the façade is evolving.
