Poland is experiencing an unprecedented surge in interference affecting GPS and other satellite-navigation systems, with disruptions increasingly affecting smartphones, drones, ships and aviation and raising wider security concerns across NATO’s strategically sensitive Baltic frontier.
New measurements from Poland’s National Institute of Telecommunications (IŁ-PIB) show that interference has intensified dramatically during 2026, particularly around Pomerania and the Gdańsk–Gdynia–Sopot metropolitan area on Poland’s Baltic coast.
The institute says the interference is external and associated with electronic-warfare activity in the Baltic Sea region.
GPS Problems on Most Days
The scale of the disruption has become particularly striking during the summer.
In May and June 2026, significant interference lasting for hours and affecting all Global Navigation Satellite System, or GNSS, frequency bands was detected on approximately 70% of days.
Only 10% of days in May and 13% in June were completely free from interference.
The situation remained severe in August.
During the first 19 days of the month, full-scale interference was recorded on 63% of days, meaning civilian satellite-navigation receivers experienced major disruption on roughly two out of every three days.
Monitoring has detected anomalies since January 2024, but Polish researchers say both their frequency and intensity have increased sharply since the beginning of 2026.
Phones, Cars and Transport Systems Are Affected
The problem extends far beyond military equipment.
GNSS signals provide location and timing information for enormous numbers of civilian systems.
When interference becomes severe, smartphone maps can suddenly lose their position, show users in the wrong location or become unable to calculate a route.
Public and shared transportation can also be affected. The displayed positions of buses, vehicles, bicycles and scooters can become inaccurate when their tracking equipment receives corrupted satellite signals.
Drones face an even greater challenge because many civilian and commercial systems depend heavily on satellite positioning for navigation and automated flight functions.
Shipping Faces a Serious Navigation Risk
Poland’s location on the Baltic makes the maritime consequences particularly important.
Ships operating around Gdańsk and elsewhere in the Baltic have reported GPS jamming and spoofing — two related but distinct forms of electronic interference.
Jamming overwhelms satellite-navigation signals, preventing a receiver from obtaining a reliable position.
Spoofing is potentially more deceptive because false signals can cause equipment to calculate an incorrect position while appearing to function normally.
The U.S. Coast Guard’s Navigation Center recorded reports this year involving vessels around Gdańsk experiencing both jamming and spoofing, including one report in which a vessel’s displayed location was shifted toward areas east of its actual position.
Maritime authorities have consequently continued warning vessels operating in the Baltic about GNSS, AIS, radar and other navigation interference.
Polish Navy Also Encounters Interference
The problem is not restricted to civilian ships.
On August 21, the Polish Navy minehunter ORP Albatros encountered GPS interference while operating in the Baltic Sea, according to NATO’s Joint Force Command Brunssum.
The incident highlighted the security dimension of the problem: satellite-navigation interference is occurring in waters where NATO countries conduct military operations and where Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave sits between Poland and Lithuania.
Military vessels and aircraft generally possess alternative navigation systems and procedures, but widespread interference can complicate operations and increase the risk of navigational errors.
Attention Turns Toward Kaliningrad
Polish researchers and other regional experts have repeatedly identified Russia’s Kaliningrad region as a major suspected source of jamming and spoofing affecting the Baltic.
Poland’s National Institute of Telecommunications describes the interference as external and connected to electronic-warfare systems operating in the Baltic region.
Lithuanian authorities have separately reported a substantial expansion of Russian GPS-spoofing infrastructure in Kaliningrad.
Lithuania’s communications regulator said in May that equipment operating from Kaliningrad could falsify satellite-navigation signals at distances of up to approximately 450 kilometers, potentially bringing large parts of Poland, the Baltic states and neighboring areas within range.
Moscow has rejected Western accusations concerning such interference and has characterized them as part of a campaign against Russia.
Aviation Is Another Major Concern
Aircraft are among the most sensitive users of satellite navigation.
European aviation authorities have been monitoring a substantial rise in GNSS interference across eastern Europe, the Baltic and other areas close to geopolitical flashpoints.
Data published by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) lists the Warsaw Flight Information Region among areas recently affected by reported GNSS spoofing and interference.
Modern commercial aircraft are not entirely dependent on GPS and have alternative navigation systems and procedures available when satellite signals become unreliable.
Nevertheless, persistent jamming can increase pilot workload, interfere with navigation procedures and complicate approaches to airports.
That makes the problem particularly sensitive in the airspace surrounding Poland and the Baltic states, where civilian aviation operates alongside extensive NATO and Russian military activity.
A Wider Baltic Security Problem
Poland is not alone.
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Sweden have also reported significant increases in satellite-navigation interference.
The trend has become increasingly visible since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, transforming the Baltic region into one of Europe’s most heavily monitored security zones.
The growing use of electronic warfare in and around conflict zones also demonstrates how military technology can create effects far beyond the battlefield.
A jammer intended to disrupt drones or military navigation can potentially interfere with civilian aircraft, ships, vehicles and smartphones across hundreds of kilometers.
Poland Is Building New Defenses
Warsaw is now working to strengthen its ability to detect and map the interference.
Poland is developing monitoring capabilities using the ASG-EUPOS geodetic network, while the Polish Space Agency is planning a dedicated sensor network to provide better information about satellite-navigation disruptions.
For ordinary users in affected areas, researchers recommend avoiding complete dependence on live GPS navigation and keeping offline maps or alternative navigation methods available.
For aviation and maritime operators, the stakes are considerably higher.
The Polish experience demonstrates that GPS disruption is no longer an occasional technical inconvenience. Along Europe’s eastern frontier, reliable satellite navigation has increasingly become a security and infrastructure issue directly connected to the wider confrontation in the Baltic region.
And with Polish researchers warning that the interference could continue for as long as electronic-warfare activity persists nearby, the problem is unlikely to disappear soon.
